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SUPPORTING TEAMS IN CRISIS WITH IT: A PRELIMINARY COLLABORATION FRAMEWORK
Earl McKinney Jr.
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio
To support their teams in crisis, organizations seek to leverage advances in information technology. These advances
include automation support to the warfighting team (e.g. an electronic checklist for a flight crew), as well as
collaboration support such as linking engaged combat troops to intelligence services. While automated support is
rapidly developing, very little consideration has been given to enhancing the collaboration support for teams that
face crisis. Here we suggest a preliminary set of IT system attributes to support collaboration for teams that face
crisis. These attributes are based on two frameworks that have been developed to mitigate the effects of crisis. One
is an organizational approach called the High Reliability Organization (HRO), the other, a team approach based on
Crew Resource Management (CRM). Here we suggest attributes of an IT system to support teams that face crisis
based on these two approaches.
Introduction
To support their teams in crisis, organizations seek to
leverage advances in information technology. These
advances include automation support to the
warfighting team (e.g. an electronic checklist for a
flight crew), as well as collaboration support such as
linking engaged combat troops to intelligence services.
Understanding how to support teams that face crisis
is essential. Currently IT support includes display
systems (Hamblin, 2003; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001;
Vicente, 2003), intelligent support systems (Koester
& Mehl, 2003; Palmer & Degani, 2001; Wischusen et
al., 2003), decision support systems (Smith, Johnson,
& Paris, 2004), and a wide variety of other technical
solutions (Stoner, et al., 2004). These systems give
automated support to teams in crisis. However, very
little consideration has been given to enhancing the
collaboration support for teams that face crisis
(Huang, 2004; Nunamaker, 1997).
Collaboration
Collaborative support for these teams in the past was
limited by the available technology. Historically,
flight crews, military teams, or surgical units could
not be collaboratively supported as only the team in
crisis knew the local conditions and had access to the
stand alone computers that produced the crisis data.
In the past, teams in crisis had only their immediate
resources at hand or preprogrammed automated
support. Now, with advances in network capacity
and sensors, IT has stretched that hand and teams that
face crisis can obtain collaboration support from
others in the organization. These organizational
experts can now see real-time data from the crisis,
interact with knowledge bases, and reliably
communicate with the team.

To date, IT support for crisis teams has focused
exclusively on automated support.
Teams are
supported with a variety of tools such as electronic
checklists, self contained expert systems, and agent
technology. However, we suggest one fundamental
principle of crisis is that it is unexpected,
unpracticed, and unprogrammable (McKinney &
Davis, 2003). Whereas an engine failure or low oil
temperature on an engine may be an emergency,
examples of crisis include being shot, responding to a
novel terrorist attack, facing an engine failure over a
combat zone, or responding to novel combinations of
systems failures. Emergencies are predefined and
therefore amenable to automated support. With an
emergency, we know what is wrong and we can
optimize and train a specific response and support
that response with automated support such as a
checklist or sensor or display device. Crisis by its
uniqueness reduces the utility of automated support.
The challenges are figuring out what is happening,
and thinking through irrevocable decisions. As a
result, automated support while valuable should not
be the only available support for teams that face
crisis. Collaboration with other human experts is
necessary to aid problem discovery and to consider
ramifications of responses.
Teams that Face Crisis
As an organizational component, crisis teams inherit
the organization’s resources, culture, and goals.
Characteristics of the organization have been shown
to have a significant effect on crisis team
performance. For example, organizational culture
has been shown to affect team performance (Bierly &
Spender, 1995), and organizational goals and strategy
also significantly impact team behaviors (Kozlowski,
1998). If team performance is strongly affected by
organizational aspects, a framework to support teams
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in crisis should be based in part on organizational
activities that support these teams.
most extensive insight into organizational activities
that mitigate the effects of crisis has been labeled
High Reliability Organizations (HRO). Weick and
Sutcliffe (2001) originated the HRO framework.
They trace the success of organizations that have
teams that face crisis to five activities. These include
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify
interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment
to resilience, and deference to expertise. The first
three reduce crisis incidence while the last two
enhance resilience. More detail on these five
activities will follow. In later sections, attributes of
the collaborative support system will be organized
under these activities. Supporting crisis teams with
IT should be based on these five “teamorganizational” activities.
While support for these team-organizational activities
is important to crisis team success, it is also valuable
to consider what might, by contrast, be labeled team
only needs. The activities of teams in crisis have
been the object of flightdeck research for 25 years.
This research effort, labeled Crew Resource
Management (CRM) suggests that team-only needs
might include situational awareness, decision
making, communication, team work, personal
resources and leadership.
Here, we combine these two models and present IT
principles to support collaboration needs using both
the HRO team-organization activities and the CRM
team activities. Due to space limitations, we only
explain the HRO activities in depth as CRM activities
are more familiar to this audience.
IT System Attributes
The following list of IT system attributes is based on
a review of the HRO and CRM activities. An
explanation of the HRO activities and their
corresponding system attributes are further discussed
after the list.
System Attributes Based on HRO Activities
1: Encourage widespread near miss and error
reporting and analysis that lead to improved
processes
2: Permit recording of detailed accounts of near
misses or errors that allows new attributes to be
collected and analyzed
3: Provide the opportunity to retain and display
unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence

4: Track and display a wide variety of data for a
variety of expert interpretation
5: Increase the visibility of operational performance
measures and reward operational enhancements that
lead to continual improvements
6: Reward operational change and adapt to changes
in operations
7: Allow simultaneous action and diagnosis while
supporting on going activities
8: Permit depth of analysis and mental simulation of
courses of action
9: Identify and match experts with on going problems
10: Supports ad hoc team communication and
analysis among experts
System Attributes Based on CRM Activities
11: Be simple--don’t overly filter or over process the
original data, just put the data into meaningful form
12: Help reduce mental effort by supporting feature
matching and story telling
13: Display information cues and historical trends in
such a way that the load on an operator’s short term
memory is minimized
14: Provide a mechanism to direct the attention of an
operator to important events minimizing the
cognitive costs of interruption
15: Provide a mechanism to mitigate the effects of
confirmation bias
16: Suggest actions that would provide diagnostic
feedback from situations in which information cues
are equivocal, thereby mitigating the tendency to
attend only to the information we want to believe
17: Compensate for deficiencies in action selection
(what to do about it)
18: Enable communication value sharing
19:Aid increased vertical communication during
crisis
20:Support communication of effective dissent or
alternative hypotheses
21:Enhance accuracy and sharing of common
models on the state of affairs
Principles of HRO-Organizational Activities and
System Attributes
In the following sections, the activities of successful
HROs are outlined. Within each section, the attributes
of an IT system to support each activity are also
presented. Examples of successful HROs from the
aviation industry are also included. Descriptions of
HRO activities are based on Managing the Unexpected
by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe (2001).
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1. Preoccupation with failure
Members of HROs constantly worry about failure
and distrust success. They look hard for lapses or
minor incidents that, if ignored, could later recur and
lead to significant failures. This preoccupation with
failure is impervious to success. HROs distrust
success as it tends to narrow perception and breed
overconfidence.
This misplaced confidence in
judgment and in existing procedures limits changes to
the organization and its processes. One way HROs
fight the lethargy of success is by establishing
attribution-free error reporting procedures. Anyone
in the organization can report errors and are assured
that those errors will not lead to sanction. These
error reports are never automatically or thoughtlessly
processed by the HRO. Rather the data collected is
turned into active incident reviews and in depth
analysis that are widely communicated.
A manifestation of preoccupation with failure in the
airline industry is error reporting (Chidester, 2003).
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is one
national system, and all major airlines have their own
internal systems. Pilots make inputs to the systems via
anonymous
reports
(see
ASRS
at
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/). Data from these systems are
then analyzed by trainers and researchers. Their
reports are widely shared and the results of the studies
have had significant impacts (Gunther, 2003). The
ASRS is just one of several examples of airline
preoccupation with failure. Training departments at
airlines continually develop new error frameworks and
mitigation processes (Chidester, 2003). Further, they
are increasingly active in analysis and communication
of errors and abnormal situations (Haney & Gertman,
2003; Muthard & Wickens, 2003).
System attribute 1:
Encourage widespread near miss and error reporting
and analysis that lead to improved processes
These near misses and errors may contain warnings
of future problems but in the din of daily activity
appear as only weak signals of impending crisis. The
IT system must be designed to find and amplify these
weak signals. Unfortunately, weak signals, by their
nature, are not readily found as they defy easy
classification or categorization. If categories or
attributes of errors were already known to the
organization, the errors that occur would also be
known and procedures established to respond. For
example, jet engines break down, and therefore
airlines have learned to classify these failures as
engine problems. However, most weak signals are
not easily classified (e.g. how should a small crack,
or mistyped clearance be classified?). As a result,

most organizations can not respond until the wing
crack leads to a break and a crisis occurs. Thus, the
crisis IT system should permit detailed descriptions
or detailed reporting of odd events, near misses, and
weak signals. From these details, common attributes,
such as the length of a “must repair” crack, or the
frequency of clearance errors can later emerge. Once
these new attributes are known, tolerances can be set
for future inspections and reporting and attention can
shift to finding new attributes or categories.
System attribute 2:
Permit recording of detailed accounts of near misses
or errors that allows new attributes to be collected
and analyzed
2. Reluctance to simplify
High reliability organizations refuse to simplify the
complex events in which their teams participate.
Although
all
coordination
requires
some
simplification, in HROs, participants minimize this
simplification. Instead, they constantly seek to see
more, and render more complete and detailed their
understanding of both their actions and the
environment. When actions are taken they avoid the
common simplifying process of seeking confirming
evidence that their actions were appropriate. Rather,
they seek disconfirming evidence that expectations
and experience can conspire to hide.
System attribute 3:
Provide the opportunity to retain and display
unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence
One way HROs generate disconfirming evidence for
their teams is by assigning members with varied and
overlapping backgrounds to the crisis team. The
variety in backgrounds tends to increase the data that
are scrutinized and thereby increase the variety of
what can be noticed. By creating teams with
members who have overlapping experiences the team
is able to see a more complete perspective on their
actions and the environment. In addition to variety in
the team members, one other source of variety is
organizational expert variety. The crisis IT system
brings this variety of organizational experts online
with the crisis team, allowing them to notice, to
suggest, and to think ahead with those in the crisis.
With varied backgrounds comes varied experiences
and expectations and skepticism of simplification. In
addition to the variety of the team, and variety of
organizational experts, the search for disconfirming
evidence is also enhanced by a varied search of a
wide variety of sources. Therefore, an IT system
that limits simplification would have a variety of
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sensors that records a variety of data for a variety
of participants.
System attribute 4:
Track and display a wide variety of data for a variety
of expert interpretation
3. Widespread sensitivity to operations
HROs value operations above strategy. This focus on
current operations is designed to find hidden or
underlying lessons about weaknesses in the
operation. These latent failures may be found in
many areas including poor supervision, inadequate
procedures, and deficient training. In addition to
finding and correcting these significant operational
failure points, HROs also demonstrate their
commitment to operations by their focus on
correcting even minor issues.
The result is
continuous improvement in operations. To sustain
this incremental improvement, HROs seek
operational suggestions from the whole organization.
They widely disseminate and seek feedback on both
operational performance and performance measures.
This operational priority is evident in other ways-- in
the attention devoted to even small interruptions in
operations, in the frequent meetings on operational
status, and in organization structure designed to
widely distribute real time information about
operations.
Airlines are an example of HROs committed to
operations. At major hub airports, airline ground
support centers demonstrate this sensitivity to
operations. These centers refuel, clean, restock, and
support all passenger and flight activities at the hub.
Operational performance of the hub is closely tracked
and widely disseminated throughout the company.
For example, the on-time departure percentage of the
first set of flights leaving the hub are calculated and
compared to benchmarks and to other hubs at the
airline. Every hub center knows how they compare
real time to other hub operations. They work
collectively to constantly refine gate allocation
algorithms, refueling procedures, and clearance
conflicts to continually improve operational measures
such as on-time performance and resource use.
Not only should operational performance data be
available for local use, IT systems supporting teams
in crisis should be designed to widely disseminate the
state of current operations within the organization.
The system should make operational data, training
schedules, and other process information increasingly
available for oversight and improvement. This
should result in improvements to operational
procedures from a variety of sources.

System attribute 5:
Increase the visibility of operational performance
measures and reward operational enhancements that
lead to continual improvements
One key implication of operational process change is
that the IT system itself must change. Therefore, the
system must be flexible enough to adapt to changes
to operations.
System attribute 6:
Reward operational change and adapt to changes in
operations
4. Commitment to resilience
HROs are built on the premise that error is inevitable.
As a result, HRO managers take pride in engaging in
putting out fires.
Unlike managers in other
organizations who see fire fighting as a failure of
planning and a drain on resources, HRO managers
know that recovery from error is their primary
activity. Because of this priority they seek deep
knowledge of their technologies, processes and
people. In addition, they excel at adapting to swift
feedback,
learning
quickly
without
error,
recombining existing responses, and mentally
simulating courses of action. Further, they have
learned to treat while diagnosing and to adapt to
threats based on feedback from action.
The professional aviation community has realized
that error is inevitable. In fact, one report estimates
the frequency of pilot error at 5-10 mistakes per hour
(Amalberti, 1996). As a result, flight systems,
training, technical systems, and procedures are
designed to respond and recover from emergencies.
Further, pilots are taught detailed knowledge about
their aircraft systems, and their environment in order
to more accurately diagnose crisis and think through
courses of action.
System attribute 7:
Allow simultaneous action and diagnosis while
supporting on going activities
System attribute 8:
Permit depth of analysis and mental simulation of
courses of action
5. Deference to expertise
As implied earlier, HROs deliberately employ a wide
variety of expertise to avoid simplification when
responding to crisis. Not mentioned earlier is how
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HROs are organized to deploy that expertise.
Expertise is not employed in a rigid organizational
structure, rather experts are expected to self organize
around a problem. In addition, they are permitted to
make changes without multiple levels of oversight
common in more hierarchical organizations. By
pushing responsibility and authority down and out to
where the organization meets its environment errors
are noted earlier and problems more quickly
addressed. Moreover, operating dynamics are such
that when the signals emanating from the crisis are
noticed, experts find the problem and resolve it at a
low level. Quick and accurate decisions by those
closest to the action are emphasized. Westrum call
this coordinate leadership (Westrum, 1997).
Currently airlines provide a poor example of
deference to expertise. Aircraft operational decisions
are vested in the captain, and the crew, with only
limited support from other organizational experts.
While crews can use their two way radio to ask for
maintenance or weather support, the crew is cut off
from other experts in the organization and is alone
responsible for finding all potential problems. A
better system would allow crews to have on going
collaborative support that during a crisis would grow
to include a number of company experts.
To support better use of expertise the IT system for
teams in crisis must permit data and analysis to
migrate to appropriate experts. It should encourage
signal watchers close to the action to alert the right
experts in the organization about anomalies. As a
result, exception reporting, and other signals of
problems should not just go to executives but be
shared widely within the organization.
System attribute 9:
Identify and match experts with on going problems
In addition, the IT system must be configurable to
these ad hoc collaboration teams. In contrast to
supporting these ad hoc teams, traditional IT systems
have the effect of making organization decision
making rigid and predefined. However, the goal for a
crisis system should be to support the analysis needs
of a variety of experts in ad hoc teams.
System attribute 10:
Supports ad hoc team communication and analysis
among experts

Summary
To date, little work has investigated supporting the
collaborative needs of teams that face crisis. The
uniqueness of the crises event suggests that in
addition to automated support, teams that face crisis
would benefit from real time collaboration from other
experts in the organization.
The goal of this report was to develop an initial list of
IT system attributes to support teams in crisis. To
accomplish this, two main frameworks of crisis were
reviewed.
The first model, High Reliability
Organizations, suggests that to mitigate the effects of
crisis teams should be preoccupied with failure, avoid
simplifications, attend to operations, commit to
resilience, and defer to expertise. The second, Crew
Resource Management (CRM) posits that effective
decision making, communication, and a shared
situational assessment contribute to an effective
response to crisis. Using these eight activities, 21
specific and distinct attributes of a crisis IT system
were presented. Future research should further refine
this list, evaluate its completeness, and assess its
generalizability. As with other studies of crisis, it is
difficult to collect observations or conduct
experiments. On the other hand, as cockpit voice
recorders and flight data recorders become more
common, more scientific analysis of the system
attributes suggested here will be possible.
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